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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to the provisions of
Utah Code Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)G) (2001).
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1. Whether the district court judge erred in granting a directed verdict to Provo
City in finding that (a) no duty existed from appellees to appellant and (b) no breach of
duty occurred between the appellant and appellees.
The issues presented concern a directed verdict in favor of appellees. "In reviewing
a directed verdict, appellate courts use the same standard as the trial court, evaluating
whether 'the evidence at trial raised a question of material fact which precluded judgment
as a matter of law.'" Pavoni v. Nielsen, 999 P.2d 595, 598 (Utah App. 2000). "A directed

verdict is appropriate only when, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, 'the court is able to conclude, as a matter of law, that reasonable
minds would not differ on the fact to be determined from the evidence presented.9" Id.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
Pursuant to U.C.A. § 63-30-11, appellant filed a claim against Provo City on March
4, 1996, complaining of injuries appellant suffered on August 27, 1995, when he rode his
bicycle into a ditch near Tommy Burgers located at 400 West 100 North in Provo City.
Upon investigation of the claim, Provo City determined that appellant had passed through
the parking area of Tommy Burgers and upon entering 400 West he rode his bicycle into a
ditch, causing him to lose control of his bike. A couple of feet north of the open ditch is a
pedestrian area where the ditch is covered and where a bicyclist, upon a proper lookout,
could easily negotiate the ditch. A couple of feet to the south is a driveway which also
provides a safe passage. (See Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "15") The ditch is in plain view
and any reasonable person, keeping a proper lookout, would have navigated the ditch or
would have stopped. Upon these facts, Provo City denied the claim. The claimant filed
this suit with the Fourth District Court.
On August 27, 1999, counsel for each party to the suit appeared and argued the
issues with respect to a summary judgment motion. The judge denied the motion for
summary judgment based upon the Utah Supreme Court ruling in Conrad v. Walter Bank
& Trust Co., 542 P. 2d 1090 (Utah 1975). This case involved injuries sustained by a
bicyclist who was injured when he ran into a hole between a public sidewalk and street
2

that were adjacent to the Walter Bank. Prior to the injury, the bank used and cared for the
land where the accident occurred even though it was owned by the city. The area where
the accident occurred was near a driveway maintained by the bank. The Utah Supreme
court ruled that through it's use of the city's land, the Walter Bank became charged with a
duty to do so in a nonnegligent manner. The facts are similar in the present case. The
Barrientos maintained the "parking strip" by watering and mowing the grass areas. A prior
owner of the property apparently paved with asphalt the parking portion that is at issue.
The trial court used the reasoning in Conrad to deny the motion for summary
judgment. The trial court stated that the Barrientos knew of a potential hazard located by
their property, evidenced by the fact that they attempted to fill the ditch with a pipe and
painted the curb. The trial court found that there were issues of material fact that must be
decided by the trier of fact. (See Appellant's Exhibit "22")
A trial was held in the Fourth District Court in Provo, Utah before the Honorable
Judge Stott on December 12-14, 2000. During the trial, plaintiff failed to present
sufficient evidence to establish that the defendants had a duty of due care under the facts
presented to sustain an action for negligence. After the plaintiff presented it's evidence
and closed it's case, motions for directed verdict were made by both defendants. Judge
Stott granted defendants' motions for directed verdict, finding that no duty was breached
on the part of the city nor on the part of the Barrientos and that reasonable minds could
not differ regarding whether there was negligence on the part of the defendants.

3

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The defendants/appellees assert that the trial court was correct in granting directed
verdicts. Appellant failed to prove that appellees owed appellant a duty and that a duty
was breached.
ARGUMENT
I. APPELLANT DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL CONSTITUTING
NEGLIGENCE.
"To recover for negligence, a plaintiff must show that the defendant owed the
plaintiff a duty, the defendant breached that duty, the breach of that duty was the
proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries, and the plaintiff in fact suffered injuries."
Braithwaite v. West Valley City, 921 P.2d 997, 999 (Utah 1996). The appellant contends
that whether or not Provo City owed a duty to the appellant to maintain the area where the
appellant was injured is an issue of material fact for the jury. However, the appellant did
not present evidence at trial to prove that Provo City owed a duty and then breached that
duty. The ditch has never been recognized by Provo City as a driveway, and evidence has
not been produced by the appellant to the contrary. No law requires Provo City to
recognize every ditch with partial paving over it as a driveway. Nor does the law require
Provo City to recognize every curb or gutter area that has been driven over to be a
driveway. Appellant has failed to produce evidence to raise an issue of material fact
regarding the City's duty in this dispute.
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II. APPELLANT DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE AT TRIAL THAT PROVO
CITY BREACHED IT'S NONDELEGABLE DUTY TO EXERCISE ORDINARY
CARE IN MAINTAINING STREETS AND SIDEWALKS.
Provo City does not deny that the City has a nondelegable duty to exercise ordinary
care in maintaining streets and sidewalks. In fact the Utah Supreme Court has stated:
" . . . it has long been the law in Utah (going back to its
territorial era) that a municipality has a duty to exercise
ordinary care to keep streets which it has opened for travel and
which it has invited the public to use in a reasonably safe
condition for travel. The municipality is not an insurer against
accident or a guarantor of the safety of tra\ ciers, and it need
not keep its streets in a perfect or an absolutely safe
condition.'1 Braithwaite v. West Valley City Corporation, 860
P.2d 336 (Utah 1993).
This duty is irrelevant in the facts of this case. The appellant was traveling through
private property and rode his bicycle over the ditch. No evidence was produced at trial to
indicate that Provo City had breached it's nondelegable duty in maintaining it's streets and
sidewalks open for pedestrian travel in an unsafe condition for travel. Ditches run through
out Provo City. There are bridges or culverts that provide safe passage over such ditches.
In this case there was a pedestrian bridge only a couple of feet from where appellant
crashed. (See Appellant's Exhibit M15,f) Appellant failed to keep a proper lookout while
approaching a street and did not use the safe passage over the ditch.

III. PROVO CITY IS NOT OBLIGATED TO KEEP IT'S DITCHES IN A SAFE
CONDITION FOR PEDESTRIAN TRAVEL.
Appellant contends that the court should use the reasoning in Salt Lake City v.
Schuback, 159 P.2d 149, (Utah 1945). The city does not dispute that they have a duty to
5

maintain sidewalks within the city limits in a safe condition. In Schuback a pedestrian,
while walking down a sidewalk, tripped on a trap door installed in the sidewalk by a
business owner. This reasoning is inapplicable to the facts of this appeal, because
appellant was not using a city sidewalk for pedestrian travel. Appellant deviated from the
public street and sidewalk onto private property and rode his bicycle into a ditch before
entering the street.
Appellant also argues that he should be protected because he fell upon the roadway.
Appellant has failed to produce evidence indicating that Provo City is liable to pedestrians
who dangerously enter a roadway and sustain injuries. Appellant has offered no evidence
that Provo City failed to keep the roadway safe for travel.
IV. PROVO CITY HAS MET IT'S DUTY OF DUE CARE IN MAINTAINING IT'S
STREETS AND SIDEWALKS.
In Hemdon v. Salt Lake City, 95 P. 646 (Utah 1907) the Utah Supreme Court
stated:
"When the municipality has prepared and maintained a way of
sufficient width, smooth and convenient for travel, its duty in
this respect has been accomplished . . . If a traveler without
necessity (caused by the imperfect or dangerous condition of
the traveled road), or for his own convenience or pleasure,
deviates from the traveled track, it being in good condition,
and in so doing meets with an accident from some cause
outside such track, the municipality will not be liable for the
resulting damage.'1

Provo City's duty of due care has been satisfied because Provo City has prepared
and maintained the sidewalks and streets in the area of the accident of sufficient width,
6

smoothness and convenience for travel. Appellant deviated from the streets and sidewalks
and ventured onto private property. As appellant exited private property, he failed to keep
a proper look out. Due to appellant's own negligence, he rode his bicycle into the ditch.
Provo City should not be held liable for the resulting damage.
V. PROVO CITY DOES NOT HAVE A DUTY TO REQUIRE ALL PROPERTY
OWNERS TO CHANGE MATERIALS ON THEIR PLANTER AREAS.
Appellant suggests that Provo City has a duty to require all property owners to
change materials located between the sidewalk and the street, so as not to be construed as
a driveway. Tommy Burgers is located in the central business district where many
business owners have cement or asphalt between the curb and the sidewalk. While Provo
City may have a right to request property owners to change materials located between the
sidewalk and the street, appellant assumes this is a duty of Provo City. Appellant quotes
Ingram v. Salt Lake City, 733 P.2d 126 (Utah 1987) stating that "Streets from side to side,
including the sidewalks and all area between, are primarily for the public use. Public use
is paramount and that the City has a duty to maintain that area for the safety of the
public." Appellant claims that asphalt located between the sidewalk and the ditch
misleads pedestrians into thinking it is a driveway. Appellant does not provide evidence
of this other than stating that certain people use the area as a driveway. To a reasonable
observer, an asphalted planter areas does not automatically transform the area into a
driveway, especially in the central business district where many businesses have cement or
asphalt between the sidewalk and the ditch.
7

VI. APPELLANT DID NOT PRODUCE EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH THAT
PROVO CITY HAS A DUTY TO RECOGNIZE ALL AREAS OF TRAVEL ONTO
PRIVATE PROPERTY AS DRIVEWAYS.
The appellant contends that Provo City had a duty to require the Barrientos to
either properly construct a driveway or not to use the planter area as a driveway.
Appellant cites U.C.A.§72-7-104 which states:
(1) If any person, firm, or corporation installs, places,
constructs, alters, repairs, or maintains any approach road
driveway, pole, pipeline, conduit, sewer ditch, culvert, outdoor
advertising sign, or any other structure or object of any kind or
character within the right-of-way of any highway without
complying with this title, the highway authority having
jurisdiction over the right-of-way may:
(a) remove the installation from the right-of-way or require the
person, firm, or corporation to remove the installation; or
(b) give written notice to the person, firm, or
corporation to remove the installation from the right-of-way.
(Emphasis added)
The Utah State Legislature does not create a duty for a highway authority to
remove a perceived driveway, rather it grants the highway authority the tools necessary to
remove an installation. Furthermore, appellant discusses Provo City Code 15-10-050
which prescribes the steps necessary for a land owner to install driveways. This code
section does not prescribe a duty upon the municipality to insist for a person to apply for a
driveway application. No affirmative duty is placed upon Provo City to either insist that a
perceived drive approach be removed or that a perceived drive approach be maintained in
a certain way. In this case, there is no culvert over the ditch where the accident occurred.
Anyone wanting to risk driving over the ditch in a car may be able to use the area as a
8

driveway but it is clearly not one. A culvert for pedestrians is available for safe access to
the street and appellant could have used that path had he made any effort to look where he
was going.
VII. REASONABLE MINDS COULD NOT DIFFER WITH REGARD TO THE
ISSUE OF WHETHER PROVO CITY WAS NEGLIGENT.
The trial court correctly granted appellees motion for directed verdict because
appellant failed to present evidence at trial that raised a question of material fact.
Appellant assumes that Provo City owes the appellant a duty by using case law relating to
a municipality's duty in maintaining streets and sidewalks. Provo City does not dispute
that it has a duty of due care in maintaining it's streets and sidewalks. Appellant has not
produced evidence that produces a question of material fact regarding Provo City's duty to
pedestrians who deviate from a street or sidewalk and exit over a ditch. The proximate
cause of the appellants injuries was due to the appellant's failure to keep a proper lookout.
Reasonable minds could not differ as to whether a question of material fact has been
presented in regards to the duty of the appellees, and therefore the directed verdict should
be upheld as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
The trial court was correct in granting appellees motion for directed verdict.
Appellant did not provide sufficient evidence at trial to establish that appellee, Provo City,
owed appellant a duty and breached that duty. Provo City does not dispute that it has a
nondelegable duty to maintain it's streets and sidewalks. This nondelegable duty does not
9

insure a pedestrian's safety when a pedestrian deviates from the streets and sidewalks and
negligently rides a bicycle over a ditch.
Appellant has not established a duty upon Provo City to require every perceived
drive approach as a driveway. Furthermore, Provo City agrees that public use of streets
from side to side including sidewalks to the street are for the public use. Appellant did not
establish at trial that asphalt and cement located between the sidewalk and the curb in the
area is unsafe for public use.
Provo City maintains ditches throughout the city for storm water and irrigation
purposes. Provo City does not recommend pedestrian travel directly over the ditch. A
reasonable person could not conclude that the appellant has raised issues of material fact
relating to appellees duty to the appellant in the facts presented. Appellees request that
this court affirm the trial court's decision in granting appellees motion for directed verdict.
DATED this J o ^ d a y of July 2002

Provo City Attorney's Office

David C. Dixon
Attorney for Provo City

10

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing
Brief of Appellee to Kathleen S. Phinney at 3000 North University Ave. #300, Provo, Utah
84604, and to Donald J. Purser, 2595 East 3300 South, 3rd Floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84109,
this /fl&C&av of July 2002.

